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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ms. Oxford appeals from her judgment of conviction for burglary and second degree
kidnapping, arguing: (1) the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for funds
to retain an expert witness; (2) the district court erred in refusing to permit the psychologist who
examined her for purposes of her competency evaluation to testify at trial regarding her mental
condition; and (3) the district court erred in ordering her to pay restitution in the amount of
$6,072.09 to the Idaho Industrial Commission for expenses ostensibly incurred for medical
treatment of Bambi Thometz. She submits this Reply Brief to respond to the State’s legal
argument on these issues.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Oxford included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in her Appellant’s
Brief, which she relies on and incorporates herein. (See Appellant’s Br., pp.1-6.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court deny Ms. Oxford her constitutional right to due process and equal
protection when it denied her motion for funds to retain an expert witness to assist with
her defense?

II.

Did the district court err in refusing to allow Dr. Traughber to testify as an expert witness
for the defense at trial?

III.

Did the district court err in ordering Ms. Oxford to pay restitution in the amount of
$6,072.09 to the Idaho Industrial Commission for expenses ostensibly incurred by
Ms. Thometz for medical treatment?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Denied Ms. Oxford Her Constitutional Right To Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied Her Motion For Funds To Retain An Expert Witness To Assist With
Her Defense
Ms. Oxford argued in her Appellant’s Brief that the district court abused its discretion in
effectively denying her request for funds to retain an expert witness to assist her in defending her
case based on lack of specific intent. (Appellant’s Br., pp.8-13.) Ms. Oxford specifically stated
that this Court reviews a district court’s denial of a request for expert assistance at public
expense for an abuse of discretion, relying on State v. Brackett, 160 Idaho 619, 634 (Ct. App.
2016). (Appellant’s Br., p.8.) Ms. Oxford argued the district court abused its discretion because
its decision denied Ms. Oxford her constitutional right to a fair trial and violated Idaho
Code § 19-852. (Appellant’s Br., pp.8-13.) Surely a district court does not act within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it, thereby abusing its discretion, when it denies a defendant her
constitutional right to a fair trial and violates an Idaho statute. See Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (stating standard for reviewing a trial court’s exercise of its
discretion).
Despite this rather straightforward application of the abuse of discretion standard of
review, the State argues strenuously in its Respondent’s Brief that Ms. Oxford cannot raise a
constitutional or statutory challenge to the district court’s decision effectively denying her
request for funds to retain an expert witness. (Respondent’s Br., pp.10-13.) The State contends
Ms. Oxford can challenge the district court’s decision only as fundamental error, and failed to do
so. (Respondent’s Br., pp.11-12.)
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The State misapprehends Ms. Oxford’s argument. Ms. Oxford clearly argued in her
Appellant’s Brief that the district court abused its discretion by effectively denying her request
for funds to retain an expert witness. (Appellant’s Br., pp.8-13.) This is the proper standard of
review under Idaho law:
In determining whether to provide additional assistance at public expense, the
Idaho Supreme Court has held that such assistance is not “automatically
mandatory, but rather depends upon [the] needs of the defendant as revealed by
the facts and circumstances of each case.” State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 838,
537 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1975). It is incumbent upon the trial court to consider the
needs of the defendant and the facts and circumstances of the case and then decide
whether an adequate defense is available to the defendant without the assistance
of the requested expert or investigative aid. [State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395
(1982).] Denial of a request for expert or investigative assistance will not be
disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion by rendering a
decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the circumstances of the
case. Id.
Brackett, 160 Idaho at 634. Ms. Oxford filed a motion for expert witness funds in the district
court, and properly challenges the denial of that motion on appeal. That the district court’s
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion because it is contrary to the United States Constitution
and Idaho law does not change the standard of review from abuse of discretion to fundamental
error.
The State concedes in its Respondent’s Brief that Ms. Oxford “undoubtedly had a right to
any necessary expert assistance at public expense.” (Respondent’s Br., p.12.) That concession
should resolve this issue in Ms. Oxford’s favor. The State goes on to argue, however, that
Ms. Oxford is not entitled to relief because she “found an expert to testify;” specifically,
Dr. Traughber, and there is no constitutional right to choose an expert of one’s personal liking.
(See Respondent’s Br., pp.12-13.) The State acknowledges in a footnote that the district court did
not permit Dr. Traughber to testify. (Respondent’s Br., p.12, note 3.) That, of course, defeats the
State’s argument that Ms. Oxford “found an expert to testify.”
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In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the United States Supreme Court explained that
“when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to
be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense.” Id. at 83; see also Brackett, 160 Idaho at 633
(citing Ake). The State argued—successfully in the trial court—that Dr. Traughber did not
conduct an appropriate examination of Ms. Oxford for purposes of forming an opinion as to her
specific intent, because he was only asked to evaluate her competency. As a result,
Dr. Traughber did not assist Ms. Oxford in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of her
defense based on lack of specific intent, and was in fact prohibited from testifying at
Ms. Oxford’s trial. (See R., pp.229-30; 7/2/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-10; Tr., p.141, L.11 – p.142, L.11,
p.143, Ls.7-9.)
The fact that the district court’s decision to deny Ms. Oxford’s request for funds to retain
an expert witness was not consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Ake, and contrary to
§ 19-852(1)(b), means it was an abuse of discretion, and Ms. Oxford is entitled to relief on
appeal. See Brackett, 160 Idaho at 633-34.

II.
The District Court Erred In Refusing To Allow Dr. Traughber To Testify As An Expert Witness
For The Defense At Trial
Ms. Oxford argued in her Appellant’s Brief that the district court erred in refusing to
allow Dr. Traughber to testify as an expert witness for the defense because his testimony would
have helped the jury to understand the evidence and determine a fact at issue. (Appellant’s
Br., pp.13-17.) This Court reviews questions of relevance de novo, see State v. Raudebaugh, 124
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Idaho 758, 764 (1993), and Ms. Oxford argued Dr. Traughber’s testimony regarding her
extensive history of severe mental illness and his diagnosis of her as suffering from a psychiatric
disorder was relevant, as it would have assisted the jurors in determining whether she possessed
the specific intent necessary to be found guilty of burglary and second degree kidnapping.
(Appellant’s Br., pp.13-17.)
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Dr. Traughber’s proffered testimony was not
relevant, as Ms. Oxford’s general mental health would not have constituted a defense to the
charged crimes. (See Respondent’s Br., p.17.) That Dr. Traughber could not have testified
specifically as to whether Ms. Oxford possessed the necessary intent to commit burglary and
second degree kidnapping does not mean this evidence was irrelevant.
It was ultimately for the jury to determine, as finders of fact, whether the State proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Oxford possessed the requisite intent to have committed the
crimes of burglary and second degree kidnapping on August 13, 2017. (R., pp.101-02.)
Dr. Traughber evaluated Ms. Oxford on October 3, 2017, and, during that evaluation,
Ms. Oxford reported an extensive history of mental illness, stating she had previously been
diagnosed with schizophrenia, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. (Conf. Docs., pp.36-37.)
Dr. Traughber concluded, “Ms. Oxford is currently, and has likely suffered from a mental illness
for some time.” (Conf. Docs., p.38.) He ultimately diagnosed her with a psychotic disorder, and
recommended inpatient treatment. (Conf. Docs., p.39.)
The district court erred in concluding Dr. Traughber’s testimony would be “completely
irrelevant” unless he could get on the stand and testify that she was unable to form the specific
intent necessary to commit the charged crimes. (See Tr., p.22, Ls.12-21.) “Expert testimony is
generally admissible if evidence is beyond the common experience of most jurors and the jurors
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would be assisted by such testimony.” State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853 (2001) (citation
omitted). “The function of the expert is to provide testimony on subjects that are beyond the
common sense, experience and education of the average juror.” State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33,
42 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
Dr. Traughber’s testimony would have assisted the jurors in understanding Ms. Oxford’s
history of mental illness, what she reported as her prior diagnoses, what those diagnoses mean,
why he concluded she had likely suffered from a mental illness for some time, and why he
diagnosed her with a psychiatric disorder when he evaluated her shortly after the incident in
question. These subjects are beyond the common sense, experience, and education of the average
juror and were relevant as they made it less probable that Ms. Oxford possessed, as a factual
matter, the specific intent necessary to commit the charged crimes. See I.R.E. 401 (defining
“relevant evidence” to mean “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence”).
If this Court agrees with Ms. Oxford that the district court erred in refusing to allow
Dr. Traughber to testify as an expert witness at trial, it must conclude such error was not
harmless, as the State does not argue in its Respondent’s Brief that the error was harmless. See
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99, 601 (2013) (concluding the State failed to meet its
burden of proving the district court’s error was harmless where “the subject is not even discussed
in the State’s written brief on appeal”). (See Respondent’s Br., pp.13-18.)
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III.
The District Court Erred In Ordering Ms. Oxford To Pay Restitution In The Amount Of
$6,072.09 To The Idaho Industrial Commission For Expenses Ostensibly Incurred By
Ms. Thometz For Medical Treatment
Ms. Oxford argued in her Appellant’s Brief that the district court abused its discretion in
ordering her to pay restitution in the amount of $6,072,09 to the Idaho Industrial Commission
because the prosecution did not submit substantial evidence supporting the request. (Appellant’s
Br., pp.17-21.) The district court had overruled Ms. Oxford’s objection to the requested
restitution, but with the caveat that the prosecutor submit additional information supporting the
request by February 21, 2019, with the defense having one week after that date to file an
objection. (2/7/19 Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.12, L.13; 2/13/19 Minute Order.)
The State acknowledges on appeal that the prosecutor never submitted the additional
information requested by the court. (Respondent’s Br., p.19.) The State argues, however, that
Ms. Oxford cannot challenge the restitution award on appeal because she did not renew her
objection. (Id.) The State does not cite any authority for the proposition that a party must object
twice to a restitution award in order to preserve a challenge to the award on appeal. (See id.) The
district court clearly invited the defense to file an objection within one week of the prosecution’s
submission of additional information to the court, but absent such additional information, there
was nothing to which the defense could have objected. Ms. Oxford had already objected to the
prosecution’s request, and the district court had already overruled that objection and entered a
restitution order. (R., pp.287-90; 2/7/19 Tr., p.1, Ls.5-8, p.10, Ls.23-25.)
The State argues, in the alternative, that if this Court concludes the restitution award was
not supported by substantial evidence, the proper remedy is to remand this case to the district
court to allow the prosecution to provide the information it was supposed to provide by
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February 21, 2019. (Respondent’s Br., p.20.) The State does not provide any explanation as to
why the prosecution should be excused from meeting the original deadline, and does cite any
authority supporting its position that remand is appropriate under these facts. (See id.) This Court
should conclude to the contrary that where, as here, the prosecution fails to provide substantial
evidence supporting its original restitution request, and fails to provide substantial evidence
within the timeframe ordered by the district court to supplement its request, the proper remedy is
to vacate the award of restitution and not to remand the matter. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 161
Idaho 692, 697 (2017) (vacating the district court’s award of restitution and declining to remand
the case where the State “already had two opportunities to claim restitution”); State v.
Cunningham, 164 Idaho 759, 765 (2019) (vacating the district court’s award of restitution and
declining to remand the matter).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in her Appellant’s Brief,
Ms. Oxford respectfully requests that the Court vacate her judgment of conviction, and remand
this case to the district court for a new trial. She also requests that the Court vacate the order of
restitution.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2020.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of January, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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